Importation of average

A clause in a policy, not subject to average, whereby average can be imported if the policy is liable for a loss also covered by another policy that is subject to average. The policies then contribute on an equal footing.
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A condition in a policy whereby if a claim is covered by two policies one of which is expressed as subject to average and one not, the latter is made subject to average I like manner.

Improvement notice

Issued by HSE inspectors ordering that Health and Safety at Work, etc., Act 1974 contraventions be remedied within a specified time. The notice is served on the person deemed to be contravening the legal provision, or on any person on whom responsibilities are placed, e.g. an employer, an employed person or a supplier. The person may be prosecuted instead of, or in addition to, being served with a notice. Insurers usually provide cover in respect of prosecution defence costs.

Imputed knowledge

Knowledge of one party that is deemed to be possessed by another because of their relationship. An insured may wish to impute knowledge to the insurer on the grounds that their agent actually possesses that knowledge. In insurance, the position is complicated because for some purposes the intermediary acts as agent of the insurer while for others (e.g. carrying out instructions to effect the insurance) he is agent of the insured. The party relying upon the doctrine of imputed knowledge must prove the existence of an agency in relation to the point at issue.

In an efficient condition

Motor insurance policyholders must take ‘all reasonable steps to maintain in efficient condition the vehicle’. The insured will be excused if, having taken reasonable steps, a defect causes an accident. The negligence of a garage employee does not breach the condition unless there was negligence by the insured in delegating the work to an incompetent (Liverpool Corporation v. T. & H.R. Roberts (1964)). What is ‘reasonable’ depends on the facts. See UNROADWORTHY.

In and out policy/all in policy

Fidelity policy for banks and other financial institutions, e.g. stockbrokers dealing in securities. The insurance applies to all or some of the following instruments: bonds, debentures, stocks, scrip, shares, transfers, certificates, coupons, warrants, cash, cheques, bank notes, bills of exchange, promissory notes, title deeds or other valuable documents. Cover is in respect of loss arising from dishonesty by employees, customers or others.

In connection with

This phrase was said to mean ‘connected with, subserving and being ancillary to’ (Hatrick & Co. v. R (1923)). The test was applied in Kearney v. General Accident (1968) when an employee fell while painting roof trusses of a building. The employers’ liability policy excluded ‘any work in connection with roofs other than of private dwellings and/or shops… of not more than three floors. The judge considered that the painting of the trusses and the underside of the outer cover was ‘connected with, subserving or ancillary to’ work in connection with the roof.

In rem

Legal right or action against ‘the thing’ as opposed to the person (in personam). It includes a maritime lien that a salvor may have against the saved property (vessel or cargo). Admiralty law allows a salvor to arrest or seize property to enforce his legal right rather than arresting or seizing the owner, whose identity is often not known. The seized property is security until the claim is settled or until acceptable security is substituted. The salvor may relinquish his right to hold property and take up an action in personam for the value of the salvage award.

In transit

The goods in transit insurer covers goods while in transit and temporarily housed during the course of transit. Transit begins when the goods start to move, i.e. when they are loaded. The insurer was liable when goods were stolen from a loaded vehicle on his premises even though the journey had not commenced. The argument that the goods were not in transit failed (Sadler Bros. Co. v. Meredith (1963). In Crows Transport v. Phoenix (1965) it was held that, unless the policy otherwise provides, transit commences the moment the carrier accepts the goods. Transit does not end when the vehicle reaches its destination. In Tomlinson v. Hepburn (1961) it was held that transit only came to an end when the unloading was completed.